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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) devices have expanded the horizon of digital forensic investigations by providing a rich set of new
evidence sources. IoT devices includes health implants, sports wearables, smart burglary alarms, smart thermostats, smart electrical
appliances, and many more. Digital evidence from these IoT devices is often extracted from third party sources, e.g., paired
smartphone applications or the devices’ back-end cloud services. However vital digital evidence can still reside solely on the
IoT device itself. The specifics of the IoT device’s hardware is a black-box in many cases due to the lack of proven, established
techniques to inspect IoT devices. This paper presents a novel methodology to inspect the internal software activities of IoT devices
through their electromagnetic radiation emissions during live device investigation. When a running IoT device is identified at
a crime scene, forensically important software activities can be revealed through an electromagnetic side-channel analysis (EM-
SCA) attack. By using two representative IoT hardware platforms, this work demonstrates that cryptographic algorithms running
on high-end IoT devices can be detected with over 82% accuracy, while minor software code differences in low-end IoT devices
could be detected over 90% accuracy using a neural network-based classifier. Furthermore, it was experimentally demonstrated
that malicious modification of the stock firmware of an IoT device can be detected through machine learning-assisted EM-SCA
techniques. These techniques provide a new investigative vector for digital forensic investigators to inspect IoT devices.
Keywords:
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1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) has revolutionized the landscape
of digital forensic investigations like never before. With the in-
creasing prevalence of IoT devices in everyday life, these de-
vices are capable of storing vital information that can prove
useful in a digital investigation. A medical implant, such as
a pacemaker, can provide hints in an investigation about a per-
son of interest’s physical exertion or stress introduced elevation
of heart rate. A sports wearable, such as Fitbit, can provide vi-
tal information about the presence and movements of a person
in a crime scene. A smart smart voice assistant device, such as
Amazon Alexa, can provide a vital information about the time
its owner came home. This kind of digital evidence is not avail-
able in traditional digital forensics, where the only resort was
non-volatile storage of personal computers and removable me-
dia [1, 2, 3].
IoT devices are usually connected to the outside world in two
main ways. Most IoT devices are connected to a cloud-based
service through the Internet. This connection can either go di-
rectly to the cloud servers or in some cases delivered to a smart-
phone based app [4]. When an IoT device is subject to a digi-
tal forensic investigation, the digital evidence is often acquired
from the associated smartphone app and/or the cloud servers as
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opposed to directly from the IoT device itself. Most IoT devices
do not store a sufficient amount of data due to the limitation of
local storage. Therefore, it is fair to look for IoT data in the
user’s smartphone or cloud storage. However, the reliability of
digital evidence acquired from other places completely depends
on the reliability of the IoT device itself. There is no guar-
antee that an IoT device is running the manufacturer’s default
firmware. If the device’s firmware has been tampered with, all
the digital evidence acquired from the associated smartphone
app or the cloud servers may become unreliable.
Forensic inspection of IoT devices is a challenging task for
digital forensic investigators. These devices lack common in-
terfaces that can be used to acquire data using traditional foren-
sic evidence gathering techniques [5]. Most IoT devices fol-
low proprietary hardware architectures and use low power con-
sumption processors. Due to this reason, collecting forensically
useful information directly from an IoT device often requires
invasive techniques, such as tapping into the internal circuitry
of the device or using chemicals to expose the silicon wafer of
the flash data storage chips in order to extract data by physi-
cal means. For example, scanning electron microscopy (SEM)
has been demonstrated to be useful in extracting data stored on
EEPROM chips [6, 7]. Such invasive approaches come with
the risk of destroying or tampering the data stored on the target
device. In order to perform forensic evidence gathering from
IoT devices in a reliable manner, it is highly necessary to find
non-invasive methods.
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This work shows that unintentional electromagnetic (EM) ra-
diation from IoT devices can be a potential non-invasive win-
dow to gather forensically useful information. The EM radia-
tion patterns from the CPU of IoT devices sufficiently correlate
to the software activities. Using a pair of Raspberry Pi and
Arduino Leonardo devices as the general purpose IoT target de-
vice, this work shows that multiple forensically useful software
behavior related information can be detected. Cryptographic
algorithms running on a IoT device can be detected with 82%
accuracy while variations of the software code behaviour can
be detected with 90% accuracy through a combination of EM-
SCA techniques and machine learning in a real-world setting.
1.1. Contribution of this Work
• As a solution to the challenge of extracting digital evi-
dence from IoT devices using traditional approaches, this
work introduces the potential of EM-SCA as a vector for
gathering forensically useful insights from IoT devices.
• Experimentation and empirical evidence shows that the
software behaviour of IoT devices can be reliably detected
using machine learning techniques with over 80% accu-
racy through EM emissions in practical scenarios. This in-
cludes cryptographic algorithms that are employed to pro-
tect data stored on these devices.
• In order to integrate the EM-SCA techniques to gather
forensically useful insights from IoT devices in practical
digital forensic work flow, this work proposes a methodol-
ogy for applying the techniques with minimum overhead
and changes to existing digital forensic practices.
2. Related Work
As derived from Maxwell’s equations, EM waves can be gen-
erated by electrical currents varying over time. Characteristics
of the EM waves being generated, such as frequency, ampli-
tude, and phase, depends on the nature of the time varying elec-
tric current [8]. Based on this principle, modern communica-
tion systems generate oscillating currents on antennas that gen-
erate EM waves that propagate over free space to be captured
by another antenna with appropriate properties. The fact that
modern digital computer systems have a large number of com-
ponents that depend on electric pulses or alternating currents
for their operations leaves the opportunity open for EM waves
to be generated at unexpected frequencies without the intention
of the system manufacturer [9].
In any computer, there are multiple components that oper-
ate in a coordinated, sequential fashion according to clock sig-
nals, including CPU [10], RAM [10], computer monitors [11],
etc. Among them, the CPU and RAM are most interest for the
purpose of this paper. The CPU performs a cycle of fetching
instructions, decoding them and executing them, while RAM
maintains data and instructions when the device is powered
on. The EM emission signals from these components contain
a significant amount of side-channel information regarding the
events related to software execution and data handling. On most
IoT devices, the CPU and RAM are incorporated in the micro-
controller (MCU) chips used on the boards.
Kocher et al. were the first to introduce power consumption
based side-channel attacks; both simple power analysis (SPA)
and differential power analysis (DPA) [12]. SPA collects power
consumption variation (in mA) over time with a high sample
rate, such as 5 MHz. The authors showed that the waveform of
the power consumption, when plotted against time, contained
patterns that corresponded to the instructions of the data en-
cryption standard (DES) cryptographic algorithm. If SPA can
reveal the sequence of operations, it follows that this sequence
depends on the data being handled by the algorithm (due to
conditional branching). Designing code to minimize data de-
pendent branching, which does not show characteristic power
consumption patterns for specific operations, can prevent at-
tackers from recognizing what is executing on the device [13].
DPA is a technique that can be custom tailored for specific en-
cryption algorithms. Kocher et al. used the DPA technique
against DES [12]. The technique was able to guess the encryp-
tion key accurately, given sufficient cipher texts and the power
traces for those encryption operations. The authors state that
they have used DPA to reverse engineer various unknown al-
gorithms and protocols on devices. The authors indicate that it
may be possible to automate this reverse engineering process.
Kocher et al. hints that these techniques (i.e., SPA, DPA) might
be also achievable usable with EM emissions.
Callan et al. introduced a metric called SAVAT (Signal AVail-
ability for an ATtacker) that measures the EM signal power
emitted when a CPU is executing a specific pair of instruc-
tions (A and B). The authors show that different selections of
A/B instruction pairs emit different SAVAT values, i.e., signal
power [14, 15]. An improvement to the SAVAT technique is a
method called Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Em-
anations (FASE). The key premise behind the FASE technique
relies on the phenomena that when a program activity is alter-
nating at a frequency ( falt) that affects any periodic EM sig-
nal originating from any source at a frequency fc, it is possible
to observe two side-band signals at fc − falt and fc + falt be-
tween the fc signal. Further improvements to the SAVAT tech-
nique enabled the possibility of identifying both amplitude and
frequency modulated EM emissions from CPUs [16, 17, 18].
While it is evident from existing studies that the EM side-
channel leakage is available across various type of CPUs, fur-
ther work is necessary to identify the effect of different CPU
architectures to the EM emissions.
The simplest form of representing EM side-channel emission
data is the waveform of the signal in the time domain. Stone
et al. built matched-filter classifiers that utilize correlation be-
tween known EM signal waveform vectors with an unknown
EM signal waveform vectors to detect software activities on mi-
crocontrollers used in embedded devices [19]. In this work, the
software activities considered were individual CPU operations
such as mov, add and sub instructions. In order to generate
matched-filter templates, an assembly program that executed a
particular CPU operation continuously was used which triggers
a general purpose input/output (GPIO) pin value. This GPIO
trigger was separately probed in order to identify the bound-
aries of EM emission signals in order to extract the matched-
filter template trace.
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Stone et al. continued to demonstrated that instead of us-
ing the time-domain signal as a feature vector, it is more ef-
fective to use Hilbert transformation of the EM emission sig-
nals [20]. The advantage of this approach is that, when cal-
culating correlation of two signals, Hilbert-transformed vectors
perform better than time-domain vectors for the same signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) of signals. As in their previous work with
time-domain signals, templates were generated for individual
instructions running on a target device and these ware used with
a correlation-based classifier to detect when a device was exe-
cuting anomalous codes.
In addition to the time-domain signals and Hilbert-
transformed signals, another alternative format of represent-
ing EM emission signals is using a RF-DNA fingerprint. RF-
DNA fingerprinting is a technique to fingerprint the radio sig-
nals transmitted by various devices including WiFi, Bluetooth,
Zigbee, GSM devices, RADAR antennas, etc. This tech-
nique has been used to identify rogue devices in a deployment
through using their RF signals without physically inspecting
them [21, 22, 23, 24]. Deppensmith et al. showed that the
RF-DNA technique can be reliably applied to unintentional EM
emission fingerprinting on computing devices [25]. Lukacs et
al. used multiple discriminant analysis (MDL) in order to re-
duce the dimensionality of RF-DNA fingerprints before apply-
ing them into a maximum likelihood (ML) classifier to identify
known radio transmitters used in radar systems [24]. Similarly,
Bihl et al. showed that MDL can help in identifying most im-
portant features from RF-DNA fingerprints [26]. However, the
evaluations performed by Stone et al. on microcontroller based
IoT devices indicates that further study is necessary to con-
clude the most reliable format to represent unintentional EM
signals [27].
Wang et al. evaluated the possibility of using Multi-Layer
Perceptron (MLP) and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) to
detect software activities and modifications to the software
through the changes in EM emissions [28]. While they also
used Arduino and Raspberry Pi devices as in this work, their
evaluation was limited to a classification with fewer classes,
i.e., 2 classes for Arduino, 2 classes for Raspberry Pi, and 5
classes for a programmable logic controller (PLC) device. In
contrast, this work shows that it is possible to detect a wide
variation of changes to a target IoT device by utilizing simpler
machine learning models. Furthermore, Wang et al. depended
on an instrumented Arduino device in order to trigger the sam-
pling device while the technique used as part of this paper can
observe the Arduino device without any instrumentation.
As existing work has shown, software activities running on
IoT devices can be detected through EM-SCA techniques. In
order to use these attacks for digital forensic purposes, these
attacks must work in real-world conditions, such as target de-
vices with zero or minimal knowledge, and devices placed in
noisy environments [9].
3. Electromagnetic Analysis on IoT Forensics
EM radiation can be generated from various components of
an IoT device including the processor, network controller chips
Figure 1: EM emissions from Raspberry Pi are captured using an H-probe an-
tenna placed closer to the processor.
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Figure 2: Power spectral density (PSD) of the Raspberry Pi device as observed
around the clock frequency. A sampling duration of 0.01 seconds was used to
capture EM signals for this work.
(both wired and wireless), video displays, sensors, actuators
and many more. Among these EM noise causing components,
the processor is the most significant component from a foren-
sic point of view as it has been shown that the EM emission
patterns of CPU can be correlated with the device’s software
activities. While any IoT device can be designed with a unique
processor, there is an important commonality of components.
There are only few common architectures used for microcon-
trollers in most IoT devices, e.g., ARM, AVR, and MSP430.
This means, EM emission patterns identified from a particular
processor chip should be applicable across many IoT devices
that employ them.
Throughout the experimental study of this work, two repre-
sentative devices were used; namely a Raspberry Pi 3 B+ and
an Arduino Leonardo. The Raspberry Pi 3 B+ device consists
of a ARM Cortex-A53 quad-core processor running at 1.4 GHz
clock speed. It has a memory capacity of 1 GB. Furthermore,
it has WiFi, Bluetooth 4.0, and Ethernet for communication.
All of these resources represent the class of a high-end IoT de-
vice that is capable of running a Linux-based operating system
and comparatively heavier applications. Therefore, this device
can be used to easily emulate various existing IoT devices dur-
ing experimentation. Meanwhile, the Arduino Leonardo device
consists of an 8 bit micro-controller with an AVR architecture
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that runs at 16 MHz clock speed. It has 2.5 KB memory which
is barely enough to run simpler programs. Therefore, it can be
considered as a representative of a lower-end IoT device.
This section demonstrates the use of EM-SCA techniques in
order to gather forensically useful insights from these target de-
vices. First, the minimum required hardware setup to observe
EM emissions from the target devices is introduced. Secondly,
the details of multiple experiments is provided in order to iden-
tify various forensically useful insights from the target device,
such as cryptographic operations and software behaviour re-
lated activities. Finally, it is demonstrated that software activity
detection can be performed in real-time, making live forensic
analysis of IoT devices through EM-SCA feasible.
The source code and machine learning models used in the
experiments of this paper are available at a Github repository1
for reproduction of the results.
3.1. Observing EM Emissions
In order to acquire EM emissions from the target device,
a software defined radio (SDR) device called HackRF was
used [29]. In contrast to traditional hardware radios, SDR de-
vices consist of minimal hardware components with most of the
signal processing performed using software. Therefore, SDR
devices are highly flexible and easy to use [30]. The HackRF
device has a maximum sampling rate of 20 MHz, where each
sample has a 8 bit resolution. The device can be tuned to a
wide range of frequencies between 1 MHz to 6 GHz. The de-
vice contains built-in receiver amplifiers in order to enhance
the captured EM signals before digitizing them. While various
types of antennas can be connected to this SDR device, small
H-loop antennas are the most appropriate for the purpose of
capturing EM radiation coming from small components of IoT
devices, such as processors.
When performing experiments to observe EM emissions
from the Raspberry Pi, it was connected to a host computer
through the Ethernet port and logged into remotely through a
secure shell (SSH). This enables the control of the Raspberry
Pi through the host computer remotely during experimentation.
The SDR device is connected to the same host computer to store
the captured EM data. As shown in Figure 1, the H-loop an-
tenna of the SDR is placed right on top of the processor chip
of the Raspberry Pi leaving a gap of approximately 1 cm in
order to maximize the reception of EM emissions. While the
experimental setup keeps the signal acquisition antenna closer
to the target device, it is possible to use directional antennas and
signal amplifiers to observe EM emissions from IoT devices at
large distances up to several meters [31].
In order to observe EM emissions from a target device’s
CPU, the EM emission frequency needs to be determined. The
clock frequency of the CPU is the most fundamental frequency
for EM radiation. Furthermore, harmonics of this fundamental
frequency can also contain the desired information. Therefore,
the exact choice of the frequency depends on what has the high-
est amplitude with the least amount of external interference.
1https://github.com/asanka-code/dfrws-2019-code
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Figure 3: Waveform of the AM demodulated signal at the CPU clock frequency
of Raspberry Pi. The AM modulated signal represents the AES encryption
performed on the device. Sudden higher peaks are an external interference
signal coming from an unknown source.
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Figure 4: The EM trace acquisition and preprocessing stages in order to classify
cryptographic activities using a machine learning model.
The processor of the Raspberry Pi emits EM radiation at sev-
eral different frequencies and their associated harmonics. The
most reliable frequency observed from the device was the fun-
damental clock frequency of the processor, which is 1.4 GHz.
Figure 2 illustrates the power spectral density (PSD) of the EM
emissions surrounding this specific clock frequency. A strong
peak at 1.4 GHz is evident alongside multiple side-bands.
As previously shown in the literature [14, 15], EM signals
coming from the CPU modulates the software behaviour on its
amplitude. In order to observe such variations, following ex-
periment was performed. The Raspberry Pi was programmed
to run a shell script that performed AES encryption operations
with a time gap of 1 second. The shell script used OpenSSL
commands to invoke the AES-256-CBC algorithm on a large
file continuously. The AES operations performed periodically
on the Raspberry Pi resulted in observations of amplitude vari-
ations in the EM signal, as illustrated in Figure 3. The blobs
that occur with a 1 second gap in the first sub-figure correspond
to the AES encryption operations, while the much higher peaks
that occur at irregular intervals are external noise. A selected
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region of the signal is zoomed-in in the second sub-figure. The
third sub-figure illustrates the EM emission pattern of a single
AES encryption operation.
When observing EM emissions from the Arduino Leonardo,
the clock frequency of 16 MHz becomes the first potential tar-
get. However, through several empirical observations, it was
identified that some higher harmonics leak more information
than fundamental clock frequency of the device. Among them
288 MHz, which is the 18th harmonic of the clock frequency.
This frequency was selected to be the information leaking chan-
nel in the experimentation presented as part of this work.
3.2. Discriminating Cryptographic Activities
Among the software activities of IoT devices that may have a
forensic interest, cryptographic operations are at the forefront.
When storing data on-board or transmitting over the network,
modern high-end IoT devices tend to rely on cryptographic
encryption as a security measure. The following experiment
investigates the possibility of using EM emissions of IoT de-
vices in order to automatically detect when they perform data
encryption operations. Three major cryptographic algorithms,
i.e., AES-128, AES-256, and 3DES are used, as three classes
and a mixture of non-cryptographic operations is used as an-
other class. Figure 4 illustrates the procedure of acquiring data,
preprocessing data, and finally the classification to classes.
Data Acquisition: The same hardware configuration with a
Raspberry Pi as the target device and a HackRF as the EM sig-
nal capturing device are used in this experiment. In order to
train a classifier to detect cryptographic operations, a labeled
EM trace set is necessary for each classification class. To as-
sist in this task, a UDP communication channel between the
Raspberry Pi and the host computer was established through
the Ethernet cable. To reduce unnecessary EM noise capture,
each time the Raspberry Pi perform a cryptographic operation,
it notified the host computer immediately before and after by
sending UDP packets. This allows the host computer to iden-
tify the time period of the EM data stream coming from the
HackRF, that corresponds to the cryptographic operation. Fu-
ture work will focus on automatically identifying the necessary
emissions through a sliding window, eliminating this step. Each
such identified EM signal segments are saved as an EM trace
along with the label of the cryptographic algorithm. Overall,
the EM traces collected was about 12 GB.
Data Preprocessing: Due to multiple reasons, the acquired
EM can have variable lengths in the time-domain and also
may not properly enclose the cryptographic operation within its
boundary. These reasons include the inherent difference of the
time each cryptographic calculation takes to execute, the delays
in UDP communication between the Raspberry Pi and the host
computer, and the delays in the HackRF data acquisition soft-
ware to start and stop the EM sampling. Due to the large length
and the variability of the lengths, these labeled EM trace sam-
ples are still unsuitable to be directly used as training samples
for a machine learning-based classifier. To mitigate these differ-
ences in EM traces, each trace is converted into the frequency-
domain by using a Fourier Transformation. This is achieved by
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Figure 5: Samples Fourier Transform vectors of cryptographic algorithms that
run on Raspberry Pi.
Activity Precision Recall F1-Score
Other 0.93 0.85 0.89
AES-256 0.78 0.86 0.82
AES-128 0.99 0.92 0.95
3DES 0.81 0.85 0.83
Table 1: Classification accuracy of cryptographic algorithms.
taking a segment of 0.1 seconds from the beginning of each EM
trace and applying Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [32].
Since the sampling rate of the HackRF is 20 MHz, the re-
sulting Fourier Transform contained a vector with 200,000 ele-
ments; each containing the amplitude of a frequency component
of the original EM emission. In this Fourier Transform vector,
it was observed that the variation of peaks from software activ-
ity was only distinguishable at the middle portion. Therefore, it
was decided to use only the frequency components from 1/4 to 3/4
of the original Fourier Transform through discarding the edges.
Figure 5 illustrates samples of Fourier Transforms from each
class, where it is evident that there are slight variations unique
to each activity.
The number of elements in the Fourier Transform was too
large to be directly taken as an input vector for modelling. The
dimensions can be reduced by breaking the Fourier Transform
vector into a limited number of buckets. Subsequently, a rep-
resentative value can be selected for each bucket by averaging
the values or selecting the maximum valued element in each
bucket. In this particular experiment, 500 buckets were selected
where the elements within each bucket were averaged to gener-
ate feature vector of 500 features. The number of buckets and
feature vectors was decided through experimentation and eval-
uation of the produced machine learning classification models.
Classification: A neural network was implemented to clas-
sify EM traces into the correct class that had four layers; an
input layer, two hidden layers, and an output layer. The num-
ber of hidden layers and the number of hidden nodes used in
each of the hidden layers were decided empirically by evaluat-
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ing various settings. Accordingly, the first hidden layer was as-
signed 10 hidden nodes, while the second hidden layer was as-
signed 5 hidden nodes. The input layer has 500 input nodes for
the feature vector and the output layer has 4 nodes for the four
classes. For each class, 600 samples were taken for the train-
ing process totalling 2,400 training samples for all four classes.
The learning rate of the neural network was set to 1−20, which
was decided empirically. The classifier code was running on
a computer with 64 bit Intel Core i-5 quad-core processor and
16 GB memory, running a Linux operating system. While the
EM traces acquisition and preprocessing to generate training
samples took several hours, the training and testing phases of
the neural network took less than a minute to provide classifi-
cation results. A 10-fold cross-validation was used to validate
the classification results.
Results: The results of the classification is illustrated in Ta-
ble 1. The neural network classifier correctly classified the
three cryptographic algorithms and the non-cryptographic sce-
narios with 80% accurately. Considering the fact that Raspberry
Pi was running a computationally heavy operating system like
Linux, which can make use of all four cores of the processor for
multi-tasking, the ability to distinguish between these three ma-
jor encryption algorithm settings hints that it should be possible
to detect cryptographic algorithms on much less capable hard-
ware devices. Existing cryptographic key recovery attacks de-
pend on prior knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm being
employed. The ability to identify the cryptographic algorithm
solely based on EM observations can increase the likelihood of
success for such key recovery attacks.
3.3. Detection of Software Behaviour
While heavy cryptographic algorithms are employed on re-
source rich IoT devices, simpler devices are unable to use such
computationally heavy algorithms to encrypt data due to the
lack of computational resources. Therefore, they are usually
programmed to perform a repetitive task continuously. Among
the various tasks performed by IoT devices, certain tasks have
forensic interest. These include reading data from a specific
on-board sensors, such as a microphone, writing data to an on-
board storage device, such as an SD card, and executing a com-
mand received remotely through the network. Identifying what
operations an IoT device is performing at the moment when it
was seized live could prove important. For example, if the de-
vice is currently wiping the SD card according to a command
received remotely, the investigators need to know it immedi-
ately so that they can turn the device off without waiting for
any further live analysis.
To explore the possibility of distinguishing different tasks
performed by a simple IoT device, the following experiment
was carried out. The objective was to train and test a machine
learning model that can classify simple IoT firmware with in-
creasing complexity. It was decided to use a Arduino device for
this experiment as its simpler processor matches the resource
profile of a lower-end IoT device. In order for classification,
ten Arduino programs were selected that repeatedly perform a
task inside an infinite loop. Listing 6 illustrates an example Ar-
duino program used as a classification target. As can be seen,
Figure 6: An example Arduino program which performs a time complexity O(n)
task repetitively inside an infinite loop which is used as a classification target.
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Figure 7: Power spectral density (PSD) of the EM emission from four different
Arduino programs which were used for classification.
the program consists of an infinite loop designed to represent
a repetitive task of an IoT device with a time complexity of
O(n). Each subtask the device is performing is represented by
individual for loops with a finite number of iterations. It is as-
sumed that a malicious modification to the device is performed
by adding a new subtask to the program or by removing an ex-
isting subtask from the program.
Data Acquisition: In order to collect EM trace samples for
each program, the Arduino was programmed with them sep-
arately and allowed to run with a H-loop antenna placed ap-
proximately 1 cm above the microcontroller of the device. The
HackRF was tuned to the information leaking 288 MHz fre-
quency of the target device and sampled data at the rate of
20 MHz. Since the target device was performing a repetitive
task, there was no software instrumentation required. Each
acquired EM trace was approximately 25 milliseconds long.
Since there were ten programs to detect, 600 EM traces were
acquired per class, which resulted in 177 GB of data for the
overall 6,000 EM traces. Figure 7 illustrates the power spec-
tral density (PSD) of the EM emissions of four such programs
subject to the experiment.
Data Preprocessing: From the extracted EM traces of each
program class, 10 milliseconds long segments were extracted
and converted to the frequency domain using Fast Fourier
6
Figure 8: Confusion matrix of the neural network classifier to detect ten differ-
ent Arduino programs which are labelled from 0 to 9.
Transformation (FFT). Unlike the aforementioned scenario of
classifying between 4 cryptographic classes, this experiment at-
tempts to classify 10 different programs. A 500 element feature
vector did not seem to be effective in this case. Therefore, it was
empirically decided to create a feature vector of 1,000 features
by breaking a Fourier Transform vector into 1,000 buckets. Fur-
thermore, it was noticed that averaging values within a bucket
smoothed out the most significant frequency component under
the noise floor. This most significant frequency ideally would
have been selected as the representative element for the bucket.
Therefore, it was decided to select the maximum value within
each bucket instead of averaging in order to build the feature
vector.
Even though the EM trace data were acquired while the target
device was running in a noisy environment, there was no noise
filtering applied to the EM traces before generating the feature
vectors. The choice of the information leaking 18th harmonic
of the Arduino clock frequency was made to ensure no strong
external noise source in that frequency.
Classification: Similar to the previous experiment, a neu-
ral network with two hidden layers was designed, where first
hidden layer contained 10 hidden nodes while the second hid-
den layer contained 3 hidden nodes. The input layer contained
1,000 features and the output layer contains 10 output nodes.
With 600 training samples for each class, a total of 6,000 train-
ing samples were fed to the neural network to train and test the
model to detect ten Arduino programs running on the target de-
vice.
Results: Figure 8 illustrates the confusion matrix of the clas-
sification results. The programs subject to the experiment are
labelled from 0 to 9 in the figure. As can be seen, the majority
of the Arduino programs were detected by the classifier accu-
rately. Under a 10-fold cross-validation, the classifier achieved
a mean classification accuracy of 90% for an error margin of
11% within a 95% confidence interval. Considering the fact
that currently it is nearly impossible to identify the software ac-
tivities of an IoT device without a significant support from the
manufacturer, the achieved accuracy through EM-SCA can po-
tentially be a significant benefit to an investigator to gain insight
on the device.
3.4. Detecting Modifications to Firmware
A very simple IoT device with a 8-bit processor and few kilo-
bytes of memory is only capable of running a simple firmware
that can perform a simple and repetitive task. The firmware
running on such IoT devices are easier to be replaced by attack-
ers in order to make them run malicious code. A device with a
modified firmware can cause malfunctions not intended by the
manufacturer. For example, Mirai is a malware that infected
certain types of IoT devices through exploiting their unchanged
factory default passwords [33]. It enabled the infected IoT de-
vices to take part in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
without the knowledge of device owner. Therefore, detecting
such modifications to the stock firmware of an IoT device is
highly necessary. When the EM emission signature of a target
device is already known, any change to the default firmware of
the device should cause a detectable change to the EM emis-
sion pattern. Therefore, it is possible to train a machine learn-
ing model to recognize anomalous EM emission patterns due to
firmware changes.
When detecting anomalies using machine learning models,
there are two potential directions; namely outlier detection and
novelty detection. In outlier detection, an unsupervised ap-
proach is taken where both legitimate data and anomalous data
are provided to the machine learning model. The model fits
into the legitimate data with the assumption that this data are
densely packed in the space while anomalies stay comparatively
away. In contrast, novelty detection is a semi-supervised ap-
proach where only the legitimate data samples are provided to
the model to train. Whenever new data samples are provided,
the model assesses the likeness of the new data to the data it was
trained on in order to determine whether the new data belongs
to the same distribution or not.
Since there are infinite possibilities for modification to the
default firmware of an IoT device, it is difficult to provide suf-
ficiently representative set of samples of anomalies for a ma-
chine learning model to learn. Therefore, in this case, semi-
supervised novelty detection by training a model with only the
legitimate samples is decided the best technique. In this experi-
ment, a one-class SVM with a non-linear kernel (RBF) provided
by the scikit-learn library was used for this purpose [34]. When
training the model, one of the Arduino programs used in the
aforementioned software behaviour detection experiment was
used as the legitimate firmware of the device, while a mixture
of other programs were used as the modified programs. The
model was trained by providing 500 training samples of the
legitimate program produced during the previous experiment.
For testing, 100 further samples of the legitimate program was
provided where the testing error rate was 18%. Finally, when
20 different modified Arduino programs were provided for val-
idation, each of them were detected by the model recording a
100% accuracy on anomalous program detection.
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3.5. Challenge of Evidence Data Storage
When listening to radio frequency data with a SDR, ex-
tremely large sampling rates are used to increase the amount
of information captured. When this data are saved into files, the
EM trace file sizes are considerably large even for small time
windows. For example, consider a scenario where a HackRF
SDR is capturing EM data on 20 MHz sampling rate for a pe-
riod of 1 minute. Each sample generated by the HackRF de-
vice through GNURadio Companion software consists of two
32 bit float values representing Quadrature and In-phase com-
ponents of the sample in I-Q interleaved stream format. This
means, each I-Q sample is 8 bytes long. Therefore, the size of
the 1 minute signal capture is approximately 9 GB (8 bytes ×
20 MHz × 60 seconds ≈ 8.94 GB). In order to apply EM-SCA
techniques and machine learning algorithms, thousands of such
EM traces are required - making the management of data ex-
tremely challenging.
When capturing unintentional EM emissions from target IoT
devices, it is necessary to capture a large enough bandwidth
surrounding the target EM frequency. This is due to the fact
that multiple side-band peaks that occur around the center fre-
quency can contribute to the distinguishing between two differ-
ent signals in the frequency domain. However, due to the in-
herent nature of software defined radio devices, the bandwidth
and the sampling rate of signal capture are interdependent and
it is impossible to reduce the sampling rate of the device with-
out reducing the bandwidth. The contradicting requirements of
reducing the sampling rate in order to reduce the file sizes and
increasing sampling bandwidth in order to increase the amount
of frequency domain information captured, necessitates the ad-
dition of an extra layer of processing of the captured data be-
fore saving. This can be done by collecting data with the high-
est bandwidth possible with the SDR device and then down-
sampling the data before saving into EM trace files. However,
the question arises whether such down-sampling affects the sig-
nal classification accuracy when such low sample rate data are
used with machine learning models.
In order to evaluate the correlation between sample rate of
the signal acquisition device and the classification accuracy of
machine learning models, the following experiment was per-
formed. EM traces were captured for 4 different Arduino pro-
grams with a sampling rate of 20 MHz. Similar to the previous
experiments, the information leaking center frequency of the
target device was selected as 288 MHz. After capturing 600 EM
traces per class, each of the trace files were down-sampled in
order to create new sets of EM trace files that has various sam-
pling rates; namely 16, 12, 8, 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0.5 MHz. Us-
ing each data set (representing its unique sample rate) a Neural
Network-based classifier was trained and tested. After perform-
ing a 10-fold cross-validation for each classifier, the average
F1-score was taken along with the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 9 illustrates the variation of classification accuracy
against the sampling rate where it is evident that the classifica-
tion accuracy is not affected by sampling rates as low as 4 MHz.
However, when the sample rate goes below 4 MHz, the clas-
sification accuracy plummets along with a significant increase
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Figure 9: The effect of EM trace sample rate to the signal classification accuracy
when used with 4 class classifier to identify four different Arduino programs.
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Figure 10: The variation of EM data processing overhead against sampling rate
when used with 4 class classifier to identify four different Arduino programs.
in the classification error margin, depicted in red in Figure 9.
This result indicates that it is possible to keep the bandwidth of
the SDR at the maximum possible value, while down-sampling
the data before saving into EM trace files without negatively
affecting the performance of classification algorithms. Consid-
ering the maximum sample rate of the HackRF, i.e., 20 MHz,
and the lowest possible sample rate that did not adversely af-
fect the classification accuracy in this experiment, i.e., 4 MHz,
it is possible to save 80% of the previously required space to
store the EM trace data files. This could be a significant advan-
tage when capturing EM data in on-site usage scenarios with
portable equipment.
3.6. Signal Analysis in Real-time
Initial experimentation used EM trace data captured and
saved into I-Q interleaved data files, which were later processed
and used to train several machine learning classifiers. How-
ever, when using such machine learning-assisted EM-SCA for
the live forensic analysis of IoT devices, real-time analysis is
necessary. This is a challenging task since data preprocessing
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Figure 11: Integration of EM-SCA techniques into the standard digital evidence acquisition workflow (Adapted from Du et al. [35]).
and classification tasks have to be performed within a tight time
window in order to keep up with the real-time I-Q data stream.
When delivering EM samples in real-time from SDR de-
vices to multiple software applications Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) sockets are commonly used. Therefore, in or-
der to maintain a stable real-time data processing system, the
data preprocessing and machine learning stages must perform
faster than the TCP retransmission timeout. On a Linux system,
this timeout is typically set to 200 ms and incremented at each
timeout up to 15 times. Figure 10 illustrates the variation of
the processing delay of captured data windows against the sam-
pling rate of the SDR device. Even at the highest sampling rate
of the HackRF SDR, i.e., 20 MHz, the processing delay does
not exceed 40 ms, which is well below the TCP retransmission
timeout.
4. Incorporation into the Digital Forensic Workflow
When a computing device is subject to a digital forensic in-
vestigation, the major focus is directed towards the non-volatile
storage of the device, such as hard disks and removable media.
Furthermore, in some cases, the analysis of the volatile mem-
ory of the device can be necessary as well. For example, if the
device is running at the time it was seized, live data forensics
can recover critical information such as temporary application
data and cryptographic keys [36]. However, this triage exami-
nation of a device is still a highly unreliable task compared to
analyzing disk images [35].
IoT devices, by definition, are always connected to a net-
work enabling them to deliver their data to outside servers.
Therefore, most IoT devices store a minimal amount of data
on-board. When an IoT device data is vital to make progress
in an investigation, the data has to be acquired from the cloud
back-end where the IoT data is delivered to. The reliability of
this IoT related evidence depends on the reliability of the IoT
device’s behaviour which is difficult to asses. This is where the
EM-SCA techniques can help a digital forensic investigator to
quickly assess an IoT device.
Figure 11 illustrates where the EM-SCA has to fit into the
current digital forensic analysis workflow. As IoT devices are
usually designed to be always on, it is highly possible to have
a seized IoT device still operational. Before attempting to ac-
quire any non-volatile storage data physically from the device,
the device must be switched off in order to prevent any physical
damage to the data. The longer the device is running, the higher
the risk of contaminating device data. If the device is connected
to the network, it can potentially receive remote commands to
wipe its internal storage. This situation highlights the neces-
sity of performing EM-SCA within as short a time window as
possible. The shorter the time window available to observe the
EM emissions from a target IoT device, the smaller the amount
of EM traces that can be used in the analysis algorithms. This
poses a significant challenge for EM-SCA attacks on IoT de-
vices under practical circumstances.
This work demonstrated the possibility of building machine
learning models that are trained to detect a specific software re-
lated activity of a specific target IoT device. Detection of mod-
ifications to the stock firmware of a device and determining the
cryptographic and non-cryptographic software activities in real-
time can be useful for a forensic investigator to get an insight
on a device. As Arduino and Raspberry Pi are representative of
the two ends of the IoT device ecosystem in terms of computa-
tional resources, the results indicates that it should be possible
to apply such machine learning based EM-SCA approaches to
any IoT device. Further research is necessary to explore the
methods of building generalized machine learning models to
cover commonly encountered IoT devices in digital investiga-
tions. Similarly, it is important to perform the evaluations with
the stock firmware of such devices, especially for detecting ma-
licious software modifications. It is necessary to make such ma-
chine learning-based EM-SCA to generate reliable information
with a minimal amount of EM emission observations.
Legal investigations require a significant amount of reliabil-
ity for digital evidence to be admissible in a court of law without
reasonable doubt. The capabilities demonstrated with EM-SCA
combined with the machine learning approach described in this
work need to be time-tested before being used as a reliable
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evidence source. However, EM-SCA techniques can provide
helpful directions for an investigator in order to uncover ad-
missible evidence. Furthermore, development of side-channel
mitigation techniques is an on-going interest for computer se-
curity researchers. Of course, this can pose a threat to digital
forensic investigation with EM-SCA. However, the firmware of
many IoT devices are not updated after they are shipped. There-
fore, a known EM side-channel of an IoT device can remain
exploitable for the rest of its service life [9].
5. Conclusion
As modern digital forensic investigations are increasingly en-
countering IoT data sources that provide vital information to
solve cases, the need for non-intrusive and reliable ways of in-
specting IoT devices arises strongly. This research work high-
lighted the potential of EM-SCA techniques combined with ma-
chine learning algorithms to tackle this problem. Using two
representative IoT devices, a series of experiments were per-
formed to demonstrate that the internal activities of IoT devices
can be identified with a significant reliability. An attempt to
classify cryptographic algorithms running on a high-end IoT
device indicated that over 82% classification accuracy can be
achieved with a very simple neural network-based classifier in
a 4 class classification problem. Similarly, a variety of simi-
lar programs, running on a low-end IoT device were detected
over 90% accuracy indicating that, EM-SCA can be employed
to distinguish between different software activities of IoT de-
vices with a very detailed granularity. The same approach was
demonstrated to be highly successful in a binary classification
problem in order to detect whether the stock firmware running
on a device has been tampered or not with an impressive accu-
racy of 100%.
While EM-SCA based software activity detection is usable
to gather forensically useful insights about an IoT device, it is
highly necessary to perform such EM-SCA procedures in real-
time at the point of seizure of an IoT device while the device is
still in operation. The experimentation presented as part of this
paper demonstrated that it is possible to reduce the rate of EM
signal samples through down-sampling without any significant
effect on the classification accuracy of the machine learning al-
gorithms. This enables digital forensic investigators to process
EM data on portable computing devices with less computing
resources to get forensically useful insights on-the-spot without
waiting for the reports of offline forensic analysis. Furthermore,
it was shown that EM data acquisition from a SDR device and
real-time processing of them involving machine learning algo-
rithms can be performed successfully indicating that practically
usable digital forensic software tools can be implemented on
top of such an infrastructure.
5.1. Future Work
The outcomes of this research lays the foundation for further
exploration on the applicability of EM-SCA on IoT devices for
digital forensic purposes. To the end, the following avenues
have been identified for future work.
• Minimization of the need for bespoke machine learning
models for each individual type of IoT device through the
development of models targeting commonly used proces-
sors and components across many devices.
• Precise detection of the time periods that enclose individ-
ual cryptographic operations. This can aid in efficient re-
duction of the keyspace of the cryptographic keys used to
protect IoT on-board data storage.
• Development of a metadata storage format in order to en-
able the management of EM traces acquired under digi-
tal forensic investigation scenarios by augmenting exist-
ing standards, such as HDF5 [37], VITA-49 [38], and
SigMF [39].
• Implementation of a ready-to-use, extensible EM-SCA
analysis software framework for digital forensic investi-
gators for IoT device inspection.
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